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I 
JELEVISION and the " talkies " may some day become prac- 
tical and permissible means of dramatizing the testimony of 
distant witnesses and thus minimize many of the difficulties dealt 
with in this article.' Thus far " Progress " has served only to 
make more important the proper determination of the place of 
trial. The rather arbitrary rules of venue and jurisdiction taken 
over from the common law of England were never well adapted to 
our federal system. Our increasingly mobile civilization and the 
growing discrepancy between political and economic frontiers 
have rapidly multiplied the instances where dogma, developed to 
meet such different problems, prove utterly inapplicable. 
The traditional analysis distinguishes between jurisdiction and 
venue. Jurisdiction is said to depend on physical power over 
person or property. Venue, meaning originally the place from 
which the jurors were summoned to Westminster, and later the 
county where trial would take place, has come to signify the 
doctrines which determine whether a court having the requisite 
power happens to be at an appropriate place for trial. This is 
solved by deciding whether the action is local or transitory. An 
accepted criterion is whether the action is one that might have 
happened anywhere. If so it is transitory. If it could have hap- 
pened only in one place it is local. Local actions can be tried only 
where they arise; transitory actions, in whatever court has juris- 
diction over the defendant or his property. This roughly outlines 
the law at the time we broke away from England.2 
1 In Duncan, Receiver v. Kiger, 27 Ohio C. A. 422, 6 Ohio App. 57 (i9i6), a 
motion picture film of plaintiff walking was offered as an exhibit bearing on the 
extent of his injury. On review the appellate court ordered an expert to display the 
film. See also N. Y. Times, Nov. 3, I929, at I; id., March 29, I930, at i, referring to 
police practice of making sound pictures of confessions to forestall third degree 
charges, and the admission of such evidence by Judge James Gordan, Jr. at the 
quarter sessions court in Philadelphia. 
2 For a more detailed study, see SCOTT, FUNDAMENTALS OF PROCEDURE (I922) 
c. I; Kuhn, Local and Transitory Actions in Private International Law (i9i8) 
66 U. OF PA. L. REV. 30I; Storke, The Venue of Actions of Trespass to Land (I92I) 
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The doctrine is simple to expound. It has a flavor of antiquity. 
It lends itself so beautifully to syllogistic reasoning that it may 
well be a relief to judges a little exhausted by their daily grind of 
making doubtful guesses and exercising close judgment in other 
branches of the law. It may even afford a feeling of rejuvenation 
as it leads to speculation about this little cause of action that 
stayed at home and this that went to market. There is little else 
that can be said for it. When we look to its results, we find deci- 
sions reaching the paradox that in the case of local actions the 
only court having jurisdiction may have to dismiss the action on 
grounds of venue, and the only court satisfying the requirement 
of venue may lack jurisdiction; while in the case of transitory 
actions the physical power criterion may sometimes create undue 
obstacles to the prosecution of meritorious claims, and sometimes, 
by affording plaintiffs a wide choice of forums, present an oppor- 
tunity to vex and inconvenience the defendant out of all propor- 
tion to what is necessary for a fair presentation of the plaintiff's 
own case - or to use the threat of such vexation to coerce settle- 
ment of doubtful claims otherwise than on the basis of their 
merits. 
Protest and reaction were inevitable. Courts have criticized the 
doctrine even when they felt compelled by precedent to adhere to 
it. As the instances where theory was obviously out of line with 
common sense became more and more frequent, these ceased to be 
regarded as the occasional " hard cases " against which judges 
should steel themselves lest they make bad law. Recurrent pres- 
sure of facts compelled the drawing of distinctions on other 
grounds than logic, and the rendering of decisions that can not be 
explained in terms of the old dogma. Legislation has played an 
important part in the process. 
The problem of adjustment cuts across a number of the tradi- 
tional subdivisions of law: procedure, the law of associations, pri- 
vate international law, and constitutional law. In the field of con- 
stitutional law it concerns itself with the full faith and credit 
clause, the due process clause, the commerce clause, the equal pro- 
27 W. Va. L. Q. 30I; Dobie, Venue in Civil Cases in United States District Courts 
(I925) 35 YALE L. J. I29; Wheaton, Nature of Actions-Local and Transitory 
(I922) i6 11. L. REV. 456; Wicker, The Development of the Distinction Between 
Local and Transitory Actions (I926) 4 TENN. L. REV. 55. 
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tection clause, and the privileges and immunities clause. Pre- 
occupation has been with concrete abuses and with the applica- 
tion to them of relatively restricted groups of decisions involving 
one or more phases only of the problem. The right hand of the 
law has not seen what its left hand was doing. This has some- 
times made change easier. It has made less obstructive the prece- 
dents laid down when the system was more rarely out of line with 
the facts and the pressure for change less strong than now. On 
the other hand, pressure to correct specific abuses sometimes has 
suggested warping of traditional theory in the opposite direction 
from that required to meet others. Progress in removing arbitrary 
limitations on plaintiffs' choice of forums without corresponding 
progress in protecting defendants from improper exercise of such 
choice may create more abuses than it corrects. 
Typical of the development has been the struggle with the doc- 
trine of Livingston v. Jefferson.3 Livingston sued in the district 
of Virginia where Jefferson lived, for an injury to land in Louisi- 
ana. The action was held to be local and therefore triable only 
in Louisiana, although Jefferson was assumed by everyone not to 
be subject to suit there. In criticism of the rule he felt obliged 
to apply, Chief Justice Marshall pointed out that trial elsewhere 
of actions for injury to land involves no greater difficulties of proof 
than in the case of other actions conceded to be transitory, such as 
actions for conversion of chattels, or on contracts, where title 
to land is incidentally involved. He urged that the category of 
transitory actions should include every action seeking a personal 
judgment.4 The possibility of unfairness to plaintiffs in the rule 
applied in Livingston v. Jefferson caused the Supreme Court of 
Minnesota to reject it, in Little v. Chicago Ry.,5 and to adopt the 
theory which Marshall advanced but did not follow. Unfortu- 
nately, the Minnesota court has been less sensitive to possible un- 
fairness to defendants incident to an unrestricted application of 
the dogma that transitory actions may be brought wherever de- 
fendants can be found. Indeed the Little case itself presented a 
situation where due regard for convenience would have precluded 
trial of the action in Minnesota; for the plaintiff lived and the 
3 Fed. Cas. No. 8,4II (D. Va. i8ii). 
4 Following the views of Lord Mansfield in Mostyn v. Fabrigas, i Cowp. i6i 
(I774). 5 65 Minn. 48, 67 N. W. 846 (i896). 
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defendant was subject to suit in the very county in Wisconsin 
where the damaged land was. It was apparently assumed, and 
at any rate has been frequently reiterated by subsequent Minne- 
sota decisions, that once an action is held to be transitory it can 
not be dismissed on grounds of convenience. Thus it was open 
to the dissenting judge to question whether the new rule might not 
involve more frequent injustice to defendants than the old to 
plaintiffs. 
By contrast to the development in Minnesota, the Massachu- 
setts court has expanded the category of local actions to relieve 
itself from the burden of a litigation peculiarly difficult to try 
away from its source.6 An action was brought for conversion of 
ore, traditionally a transitory action, but here involving deter- 
mination of difficult questions of fact concerning the subterraneous 
courses of veins and lodes in an Arizona mine and the application 
of unfamiliar rules of law. It was held that in substance the ac- 
tion was for injury to land and therefore local. The dismissal of 
the action accorded with sound policy, since the Arizona courts 
were open to the plaintiff. It would be most unfortunate, however, 
if the case should become a precedent for enlarging the category 
of local actions where the result, as in the Livingston v. Jefferson 
situation, is to impose arbitrary limitations regardless of con- 
venience. 
Far more significant and far more complicated has been the de- 
velopment with regard to transitory actions, first in making it 
easier for the plaintiff to find a convenient forum with jurisdiction, 
and later in limiting his choice on grounds of convenience. Joint 
debtor acts were passed to permit suit on joint claims after serv- 
ice on less than all of the joint debtors, with the possibility of exe- 
cution against joint property and property of the debtors served. 
Similar statutes have been enacted to facilitate suit on claims 
against firms.7 Foreign corporation acts have made corporations 
subject to suit wherever they do business.8 Attempts have been 
6 Arizona Commercial Mining Co. v. Iron Cap Copper Co., 236 Mass. i85, 
I28 N. E. 4 (I920). An alternative ground for the decision is the Massachusetts 
doctrine that a disseisee can not sue for conversion until restored to possession. 
7 The statutes are discussed in Magruder and Foster, Jurisdiction Over Partner- 
ships (I924) 37 HARV. L. REV. 793. 
8 See CONFLICT OF LAWS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. I930) ? 98; HENDERSON, 
POSITION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (i9i8) 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.21 on Thu, 13 Jun 2013 19:09:34 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
PLACE OF TRIAL IN CIVIL ACTIONS I22I 
made somewhat less extensively and less successfully to predicate 
jurisdiction over non-resident individuals and unincorporated as- 
sociations upon their engaging in business through local agents.9 
Blue sky laws, non-resident motorist laws, and others, have en- 
deavored to secure jurisdiction over claims arising out of particu- 
lar kinds of activity.10 Other statutes have permitted various 
forms of non-personal service at defendants' domicils." Such 
statutes, and decisions arising under them, have stretched to the 
breaking point the conception of jurisdiction as dependent on 
physical power, and have tended to substitute for it the conception 
that merely because it is an obviously fair place for trial a state 
has jurisdiction, although the processes of its own courts can 
reach neither the defendant nor his property."2 Attachment laws 
have made it possible for a state to apply property within its limits 
in satisfaction of claims against non-resident owners, and to coerce 
submission to jurisdiction generally, as a condition to being al- 
lowed to protect such property by contesting plaintiffs' claims.'3 
C. V; SCOTT, FUNDAMENTALS OF PROCEDURE C. II; Dodd, Jurisdiction in Personal 
Actions (1927) 23 ILL. L. REV. 427; Cahill, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations 
and Individuals Who Carry on Business Within the Territory (1917) 30 HARV. L. 
REV. 676; Bullington, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations (1928) 6 N. C. L. 
REV. 147; Fead, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations (1926) 24 MICH. L. REV. 
633; Note (1929) 42 HARV. L. REV. io63. 
9 Cabanne v. Graf, 87 Minn. 510, 92 N. W. 46I (1902); Flexner v. Farson, 
248 U. S. 289 (i919); see discussion of these cases in SCOTT, FUNDAMENTALS OF 
PROCEDURE 42. 
10 As to non-resident motorists, see Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352 (1927) 
Scott, Jurisdiction Over Non-resident Motorists (I926) 39 HARV. L. REV. 563. 
Miscellaneous statutes are: MASS. GEN. LAWS (I92I) C. 227, ? 5 (requires build- 
ing and bridge contractors to appoint process agents); OHIO GEN. CODE (Page, 
I926) ? I2i8(i) (requires appointment of process agent by persons contracting 
with the state for highway construction). 
A casual examination of the CORPORATION MANUAL for I929 indicates that in 
over thirty states the Blue Sky Laws require the appointment of a process agent 
as a prerequisite to obtaining a license to deal in securities. Some expressly apply 
to individual dealers, others to "investment companies" which are elsewhere 
defined to include partnerships or private individuals. Some are expressly confined 
to claims growing out of violations of the act or the sale of securities, others to 
causes of action arising within the state, and in others the language is broad 
enough to include causes of action wherever arising. 
11 See SCOTT, FUNDAMENTALS OF PROCEDURE 4I. 
12 See Dodd, supra note 8. 
13 Cheshire Nat. Bank v. Jaynes, 224 Mass. I4, II2 N. E. 500 (i9i6), and 
Salmon Falls Mfg. Co. v. Midland Tire & Rubber Co., 285 Fed. 2I4 (C. C. A. 6th, 
I922), hold that a non-resident defendant may appear for the sole purpose of pro- 
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Garnishment laws have made it possible to enforce claims against 
a defendant in a particular state, merely because the defendant's 
debtor happens to wander into, or do business in, that state.14 
It is no longer, if indeed it ever was, a safe generalization that 
it is fair to defendants that trial take place wherever they may 
be " found." On the contrary, all defendants who travel, or are 
owed debts, or whose businesses transcend the limits of single 
states, are potentially subject to suit in many places which may 
be highly inconvenient. The actual instances of resulting un- 
fairness to defendants have been too frequent to be ignored. They 
have led to various attempts at correction. 
In studying these attempts one is struck by the constant recur- 
rence of two questions. The first is one of policy: assuming that 
a court must choose between a place of trial inconvenient for the 
plaintiff and another about equally inconvenient for the defendant, 
whose interest should prevail? The second is a question of 
method. It is only another phase of the eternal problem of the 
law-where to draw the line between predicability and flexibil- 
ity. One possibility is to create a new set of rules of thumb essen- 
tially like the traditional system, modernized to accord more fre- 
quently with convenience, but based on a consideration of only 
such easily determined factors as residence of parties and the 
place where the cause of. action arose.15 The other possibility is 
tecting the attached property, conceding jurisdiction as to it, but urging against its 
sale that plaintiff's claim is not meritorious. They do not question the power to 
condition any consideration of the merits on the defendant's appearing generally. 
14 Harris v. Balk, i98 U. S. 2I5 (0905) (jurisdiction to garnish based on 
transient presence of individual garnishee) ; Louisville & Nashville R. R. v. Deer, 
200 U. S. I76 (igo6) (jurisdiction based on doing business by foreign corporate 
garnishee); see (I925) 38 HARV. L. REV. III4; Beale, The Exercise of Jurisdiction 
In Rem to Compel Payment of a Debt (09I3) 27 HARV. L. REV. I07; Carpenter, 
Jurisdiction Over Debts For the Purpose of Administration, Garnishment, and 
Taxation (i9i8) 3i HARV. L. REV. 905. Some states permit a plaintiff to garnish a 
debt due from himself. See (I922) 35 HARV. L. REV. 34I; (I924) 3i A. L. R. 7II. 
It has been held no bar to garnishment that plaintiff arranged for the purchase of 
money orders through the garnishee with a view to creating an indebtedness to 
defendant. Siro v. American Express Co., 99 Conn. 95, I2i Atl. 280 (I923), (I923) 
23 COL. L. REV. 689; cf. (I928) I5 VA. L. REV. I9I. Such decisions give astute 
counsel still wider opportunities for satisfying technical requirements as to juris- 
diction. 
15 The ambiguity lurking behind this seemingly definite concept is discussed 
infra pp. I227-28. The older technique involves consideration only of the com- 
plaint, and guesses from it as to the proper issues. 
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to inquire into the issues actually in dispute and the testimony 
actually needed to meet them, and to regard the determination 
of the proper place of trial as a matter to be settled in each individ- 
ual case after a careful weighing of all factors. 
II 
One line of development involves exceptions to the newer bases 
for jurisdiction, particularly over foreign corporations, in order to 
exclude suits which it seems more reasonable not to try within the 
state. These exceptions may arise by express language in the 
statutes, by a judicial rule of construction limiting the scope of 
seemingly broader language, and conceivably also by constitu- 
tional limitations on the power which a state can give to its courts. 
A situation which arises often enough to influence the develop- 
ment is one where the local forum is obviously inappropriate be- 
cause the facts relied on by plaintiff occurred, and the parties and 
presumably their witnesses reside, in another state whose courts 
are available. The plaintiff's selection of the local forum appears 
to be plainly vexatious. Under these circumstances no one ques- 
tions the propriety of not entertaining the action. One way of 
preventing such a suit is to deny jurisdiction as to it. But the 
question arises as to how sweeping the rule of exclusion shall be. 
A formula expressed in some recent Supreme Court decisions, 
perhaps as a constitutional limitation, and in any event as a rule 
for construction of state legislation, looks only to the origin of the 
cause of action and does not take into consideration either the 
character of the issues or the residence of the plaintiff. There 
have been various expressions of it, confining jurisdiction to 
" suits in respect to business transacted within the state "16 or 
" controversies growing out of transactions within the state," 17 or 
denying jurisdiction as to " causes of action arising elsewhere 
which are unconnected with any corporate action . . . within the 
jurisdiction." 18 
16 Mitchell Furniture Co. v. Selden Breck Co., 257 U. S. 213, 215 (1921) 
per Holmes, J. 
17 Morris & Co. v. Skandinavia Ins. Co., 279 U. S. 405, 409 (1929) per 
Butler, J. 
18 Louisville & Nashville R. R. v. Chatters, 279 U. S. 320, 325 (I929) per 
Stone, J. 
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The formula affords a convenient explanation for dismissing 
some of the vexatiously imported suits, but it goes farther than is 
necessary for this purpose. If consistently adhered to, it would 
preclude, for instance, suing a foreign corporation on a foreign 
claim even after it had been reduced to judgment,19 and prevent a 
plaintiff from attaching local assets in a suit on an indisputable 
and liquidated claim. In these instances the only effect of the rule 
would be to obstruct the plaintiff without in any way furthering 
trial convenience. Again the rule would in many cases impose 
severe hardships on plaintiffs who reside in or near the state but 
whose causes of action have no other connection with it. A typi- 
cal case is one where the plaintiff has a tort claim for injuries sus- 
tained while temporarily in a distant state. Here choice must be 
made between competing interests of plaintiff and defendant. 
There is at least no compelling argument of policy for preferring 
the place of trial convenient for the defendant. If the language 
of a statute is broad enough to cover such a case, considerations 
of policy should be more than evenly balanced to make an ex- 
ception of it. The burden of the argument would be shifted to 
the plaintiff only by treating the suggested rule of construction 
as though it were itself a legislative enactment, and making the 
question not one of construing the act but of construing the court's 
construction of it. This is construction squared. 
Where the words used afford no clue as to what the legislature 
would have intended had it thought of the case, the writer's best 
guess is that it would have favored permitting an injured individ- 
ual to sue at the place convenient for him, although inconvenient 
for the foreign corporation. The assumed larger resources of the 
defendant and the ability to shift its burdens to the ultimate con- 
sumer may justify such an attitude. A provincial desire to give 
the benefit of the doubt to its own citizens may also have some in- 
fluence on the judicial or legislative attitude. 
In Barrow Steamship Co. v. Kane,20 the Supreme Court itself 
seemed more impressed by the hardship of compelling an Ameri- 
can plaintiff to go to Ireland to sue than the alternative of requir- 
ing a British corporation to defend, in a federal court in New 
19 This was the result of the former New York statute. Anglo-American 
Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co., I91 t. S. 373 (1903). 
20 170 U. S. I00 (i898). 
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York, a claim for a tort committed in Irish territorial waters. 
Kane was a resident of New Jersey, but, so far as appears, de- 
fendant was not doing business there, and New York was the 
only possible place for trial in this country. The claim was for 
an assault alleged to have been committed while plaintiff was on 
a tender taking him to one of defendant's ships in the harbor of 
Londonderry for transportation to New York. In addition to the 
hardship on plaintiff of getting himself to Ireland to participate 
in the trial, it was likely that fellow passengers whom he would 
want as witnesses would be more available in New York than at 
the port of debarkation. A state statute 21 confined non-residents 
to suing on causes of action arising within the state, and there 
was no federal statute as to service. The Court held that state 
legislation can not limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts, and 
found the common law warrant enough for proceeding after serv- 
ice on an actual agent of the defendant. 
State legislation affects the jurisdiction of the federal courts 
only when service is on a person who is designated by or pursuant 
to the statute as agent for process but is not otherwise an agent 
of the corporation. It is here that occasion arises for construction 
by the federal court. Assuming that the statutory method of serv- 
ice involves adequate notice to the defendant, there is no reason 
why the resultant jurisdiction should be less broad than in the 
case of service on an actual agent. To give the statutory method 
a narrower scope would serve only as a trap for the unwary. Un- 
less the Barrow Steamship case is to be considered overruled, it 
justifies the hope that no such nice distinctions will be drawn. 
Although the rule of construction is laid down in cases more 
recent than the Barrow Steamship case, none of these presented 
any good reasons of policy for sustaining the jurisdiction. Old 
Wayne Life Ass'n v. McDonough 22 and Simon v. Southern Ry.,23 
sometimes cited in this connection, concerned the validity of de- 
fault judgments against corporations which had done local busi- 
ness without complying with the foreign corporation acts. In each 
case process had been served on a public official designated by 
statute who had no duty to notify the defendant. In neither case 
did the defendant receive notice prior to judgment. Thus the 
21 N. Y. CODE CIV. PROC. ? I780 (i890). 22 204 U. S. 8 (I907). 23 236 U. S. II5 (I9I5). 
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invalidity of the judgments might have been rested on the lack 
of such notice as amounts to due process.24 In two cases plaintiffs 
were domestic corporations suing on contracts made and to be 
performed elsewhere.25 A corporation, desiring to sue on a foreign 
contract in the state of its incorporation, does not present a case 
at all comparable to that of an individual plaintiff, seeking relief 
at his home on account of a foreign tort. The agents who must 
act and testify for the corporation are as likely to be available at 
the place of contract or performance as in the state of incorpora- 
tion. An additional ground for distinguishing these two cases is 
that in each the defendant had ceased doing business in the state 
prior to the action, although there had been no formal effort to 
revoke the process agent's authority.26 In the most recent case, 
plaintiff was a corporation of an adjoining state, suing a Danish 
corporation on an Argentine contract of insurance, covering a 
shipment from Uraguay to Cuba. The Court found that "the 
importation of such controversies can not serve any interest of 
Mississippi." 27 
In Louisville & Nashville R. R. v. Chatters,28 the Court cited 
both federal and state authority for restrictive interpretation, but 
found a way to uphold suit in a federal court in Louisiana for an 
injury received in Virginia. The plaintiff, who lived in Louisiana, 
24 See infra p. I229 et seq., for a discussion of these cases on the hypothesis that 
they involve constitutional limitations and not statutory construction. The Court 
did not stress the defect of notice. Indeed it appears to have assumed that the serv- 
ice was adequate as to suits arising out of the local business, perhaps because com- 
pliance with the acts would have involved designating process agents of the corpora- 
tion's own choice. See 204 U. S. at i8 and 226 U. S. at ii7 for provisions of the 
acts. Assuming the cases do involve construction, it is easy to understand a re- 
strictive interpretation of the drastic penalty for non-compliance. 
25 Chipman Ltd. v. Jeffery Co., 25I U. S. 373 (I920); Mitchell Furniture Co. 
v. Selden Breck Co., 257 U. S. 2I3 (I92I). The Chipman case rests in part on state 
decisions. The defendant was doing local business at the time plaintiff's claim ac- 
crued, but had ceased prior to the action. 
26 In the Mitchell Furniture Case the Court qualified its holding that the statute 
was inapplicable " at least if begun, as this was, when the long previous appointment 
of the agent is the only ground for imputing to the defendant an even technical 
presence." 257 U. S. at 2i6. 
27 Morris & Co. v. Skandinavia Ins. Co., 279 U. S. 405 (I929). The Court also 
relied on language making the process agent's authority irrevocable "' so long as any 
liability of the company remains outstanding in the state. Ibid. at 407. 
28 279 U. S. 320 (I929). 
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was traveling by through ticket and car, over the lines of the Louis- 
ville & Nashville, the Atlanta and West Point, and the Southern 
roads, from New Orleans to Washington. He was injured while 
on the Southern's road in Virginia. The Louisville & Nashville, 
a Kentucky corporation, and the Southern, a Virginia corporation, 
were joined as defendants. The Southern objected to the jurisdic- 
tion. The objection was overruled, although the only connection 
between the injury and its Louisiana business was that the ticket 
was sold to the plaintiff by an agent of the Louisville & Nashville 
pursuant to a joint traffic agreement with the Southern. The 
Southern was otherwise engaged in business and had designated 
a process agent whom the plaintiff had served. It was conceded 
that participation in benefits of joint tickets sold by other carriers 
does not in itself constitute engaging in local business of the kind 
which subjects a foreign corporation to suit. Yet it was held that 
the sale of the ticket to Chatters was part of the Southern's Louisi- 
ana business and that the injury arose out of it. 
One wonders whether, in case a Virginia resident had been in- 
jured there, while on a local train, the statute would have been 
construed as applicable merely because he bought his ticket in 
Louisiana - whether the decision was influenced by the need for 
testimony as to the condition of the car when it left Louisiana, 
or the convenience to the plaintiff of being able to join the 
Kentucky and Virginia corporations in one action. One wonders 
also whether Chatters would have been denied the privilege of 
suing in his home state for an injury sustained in Virginia, if he 
had broken his journey en route and had bought his ticket piece- 
meal, or in case he was returning to New Orleans on a ticket sold 
in Washington. 
The chief significance of the Chatters case is to suggest that the 
supposed rule of thumb has no definite meaning in advance of de- 
cision, and affords no real advantage in certainty to compensate 
for occasional arbitrariness in application. Is " business trans- 
acted within the state " equivalent to a " transaction within the 
state," and can a cause of action " arise " within the state al- 
though not connected with any corporate action within the state? 
Assuming agreement can be had as to the correct phrasing of the 
rule, the Supreme Court may deal less reverently with its own 
dicta than inferior federal courts. It may mold future interpre- 
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tations along lines of convenience, while the cases that do not 
get beyond the lower courts meet with more technical treatment, 
or with treatment either technical or practical according to the 
judge before whom the issue arises. Thus the rule does not obvi- 
ate the uncertainty incident to differences of judgment as to what 
policy may require. It merely adds an element of uncertainty, as 
to when matters of policy will be deemed relevant.29 
Besides actions against carriers, other situations will occur 
where the plaintiff's cause of action is in part the result of a con- 
tract made in one state, and in part the result of facts subsequently 
occurring in another. Insurance policies may be issued in one 
state and claims may be made in respect to losses occurring in an- 
other.30 Contest may be with respect to the validity or going 
into effect of the policy, the existence of a loss within its terms, 
performance of conditions as to the giving of notice and furnish- 
ing proof of loss, or perhaps there may be a question of waiver 
of such conditions. Is it enough that some conceivable issue 
under the policy may involve acts transpiring within the state, or 
must it appear likely from the complaint that all possible issues 
arose within the state, or will the court be impressed by what it 
assumes to be the most common issues arising under policies? 
Such questions of policy will have their part in determining the 
application of the test according to where the cause of action 
arises. Unfortunately emphasis on origin of the cause of action, 
rather than of the facts at issue, precludes inquiring as to what 
the actual ground of contest will be, and deciding with reference 
to it. 
A rule that jurisdiction over foreign causes of action depends 
upon whether the plaintiff is a resident or non-resident,3' would 
29 See CLARK, CODE PLEADING (i928) 75-87, 308-II, 45I-57, for a discussion of 
similar difficulty in interpreting such concepts as cause of action, and transaction, 
as used in code provisions. 
30 Statutes to the effect that contracts on lives or property within a state shall 
be deemed to have been made in the state, will not prevent such questions from 
arising, as they do not cover cases where the property is taken or the insured goes 
to another state after the policy is made. 
31 This distinction is taken in statutes quoted in Lipe v. Carolina, C. & 0. Ry., 
I23 S. C. 5I5, ii6 S. E. ioi (I923); Ledford v. Western Union Tel. Co., i79 N. C. 
63, IOI S. E. 533 (i9x9). The New York statute involved in the Barrow Steamship 
case was amended in I9I3. For history of the New York legislation, see Gregonis 
v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 235 N. Y. 152, I39 N. E. 223 (I923). 
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be more satisfactory to those who prefer plaintiffs' to defend- 
ants' convenience, but the facts of the Barrow Steamship case in- 
dicate that even this formulation of the exception to jurisdiction 
is too arbitrary. Insofar as the plaintiff's residence affects the 
jurisdiction, the essential thing is that the local forum is substan- 
tially nearer to it than any other which may be available. A New 
Jersey plaintiff who can not get jurisdiction at home, can make 
out just as good a claim as a New Yorker for having trial in New 
York rather than in a foreign country or in some remote state 
of the United States. To deny him access to the New York courts 
would not be to draw a distinction on grounds of procedural con- 
venience but to discriminate against him as a non-citizen and quite 
likely to violate the privileges and immunities clause.32 
III 
All the foregoing arguments against a sweeping construction of 
foreign corporation acts excluding all foreign suits apply with 
even greater force against a similarly broad constitutional limita- 
tion under the due process clause. Once a defendant is subject 
to suit for any purpose, the due process clause can at most exclude 
jurisdiction as to actions which it is manifestly unreasonable to try 
within the state. This is true regardless of what theory is adopted 
as to the basis for jurisdiction over foreign corporations.33 It 
may be unreasonable to " imply " consent as to certain suits. It 
may be an unreasonable regulation of the local business of the 
corporation to provide for local action as to certain suits. It may 
even be so unreasonable and arbitrary as to deny due process not- 
withstanding the corporation's " presence." But the unreason- 
ableness dealt with by the due process clause must be more than 
disagreement with the Supreme Court's views on a matter of pol- 
icy. Conceivably the Court may think it unsound to prefer plain- 
tiff's to defendant's convenience in fixing the place of trial. It 
may think that the ease of administering a rule of thumb makes it 
32 Discussion of this point is reserved for treatment in a subsequent article. 
33 See Note (I929) 42 HARV. L. REV. io63, for a summary of theories of con- 
sent, presence, doing of business, and doing of acts. The " act " theory is the most 
recent, and does not purport to be an exclusive explanation. It is confined to 
jurisdiction over claims arising out of the act done within the state. 
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preferable to a more individualized treatment. But there seems 
little likelihood that it will hold that states differing from its own 
views on such points exceed the bounds of reason. 
The argument that jurisdiction can extend only to causes of 
action arising locally rests largely on Old Wayne Life Ass'n v. Mc- 
Donough 3 and Simon v. Southern Ry.35 The cases involve the 
validity of default judgments which perhaps did not amount to 
authoritative state court determination of the scope of the state 
statutes involved. Hence the Supreme Court may only have con- 
strued the statutes as not authorizing service. The opinions 
though somewhat obscure give the impression that the Court 
thought it was deciding a point of constitutional law. On the 
other hand, the cases have subsequently been cited as dealing with 
construction of the state acts. At any rate, as pointed out in previ- 
ous discussion of these cases, they are explainable on the ground 
enunciated in Wuchter v. Pizzutti,76 that unless the public official 
designated as process agent is required to notify the non-resident 
defendant, service on him is not sufficiently calculated to inform 
defendant of the action to constitute due process. They do not 
justify a holding that there would be a similar limitation on juris- 
diction where there is a requirement that notice be given. Again, 
as was urged in discussing the supposed rule of construction, there 
is no reason to distinguish between methods of service so long as 
they tend to give adequate notice. Unless such distinctions are 
to be drawn, there are at least three cases, two prior to, and one 
later than, the Old Wayne and Simon cases, upholding jurisdiction 
as to foreign causes of action. They are all cases where process 
was served on an actual agent of the corporation. They are all 
cases where the plaintiff had some legitimate interest in seeking 
the local forum.37 
34 204 U. S. 8 (i907). 
35 236 U. S. II5 (I9I5). 
36 276 U. S. I3 (I928). This involved a non-resident motorist statute. The 
same principle was applied to a foreign corporation act in Consolidated Flour Mills 
Co. v. Moegge, 278 U. S. 559 (I928). The corporation actually did get notice of 
the action. 
37 New York, Lake Erie & Western R. R. v. Estell, 147 U. S. 59I (i893); 
Barrow Steamship Co. v. Kane, i70 U. S. i00 (i898); Missouri, K. & T. Ry. y. 
Reynolds, 255 U. S. 565 (1921); for facts see opinions below in 224 Mass. 379, 
II3 N. E. 413 (i9i6), 228 Mass. 584, ii7 N. E. 913 (i9i7), and 233 Mass. 32, 123 
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The only question seems to be whether the due process clause 
precludes jurisdiction where no such interest of the plaintiff is 
involved. Those arguing that " presence " of the foreign corpora- 
tion within the state is the true basis for jurisdiction over it con- 
tend that such presence should have the same consequences to it 
as physical presence of an individual has to him.38 The antiquity 
of the practice of subjecting an individual to suits wherever he 
may be found precludes him from invoking the due process clause, 
and why should the ill-favored foreign corporation fare better? 
One can only guess whether the argument for companions in 
misery will prevail upon the Supreme Court.39 In Davis v. Farm- 
N. E. 235 (1919). See also Herndon Carter Co. v. Norris Son & Co., 224 U. S. 496 
(1912); St. Louis, S. W. Ry. v. Alexander, 227 U. S. 2i8 (1913), involving some- 
what similar facts and results, but in which the issues were less clearly presented 
to the Court. 
The Barrow Steamship case has already been discussed in detail. In the Estell 
case plaintiff sued in a court of the state where he lived, for negligent injury to 
cattle, which occurred in Ohio. The shipping contract called for transportation by 
defendant and connecting carriers to a point in Missouri. The state court was 
held to have jurisdiction. The Reynolds case is a memorandum decision affirming on 
the authority of the Estell case the decision of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts 
exercising jurisdiction over a Kansas corporation. Plaintiff was suing on notes which 
had been made, issued, and negotiated outside of Massachusetts. It did not appear 
where he lived, or whether he was suing in his own right or as representative of 
the several holders of the notes. Other defendants were joined as "trustees " 
owing money to the principal defendant. This suggests that plaintiff may have 
gone to Massachusetts as the most available state to reach assets of the defendant. 
At any rate defendant's objection was only the technical one that the cause of 
action did not arise in Massachusetts. There was no showing that it was in 
fact unreasonable for plaintiff to sue there. 
38 For an able exposition of the presence theory, see HENDERSON, POSITION OF 
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW c. V. Henderson was 
more absorbed in tracing the Supreme Court's struggles to escape Chief Justice 
Taney's dictum that a corporation can exist only in the state of its incorporation, 
than in the procedural consequences of his theories. In combating traditional 
dogma as to what happens when corporate agents act in another state, he was less 
sceptical as to the dogma that allegiance, consent, and presence are the only pos- 
sible bases for jurisdiction. The first being out of the question, he assumed 
that by proving consent an inadequate explanation he established the theory of 
presence. 
39 CONFLICT OF LAWS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1926) 23, seems to assume 
that it is necessary to choose between a rule excluding or allowing jurisdiction as to 
all cases arising outside the state. It sees no reason for distinguishing between notice 
through a public official and notice through an actual agent, and suggests that the 
Barrow case is a dubious precedent in view of the Old Wayne and Simon cases. 
But it cites Reynolds v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry., 255 U. S. 565 (1921), only in the 
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ers Cooperative Co.,40 the Supreme Court of Minnesota had in- 
sisted upon entertaining a vexatiously imported action as against 
defendant's objections under both the due process and commerce 
clauses. The reversal of its decision was rested entirely on the 
commerce clause, and the due process point was expressly left 
open. 
IV 
The Davis case was the first to hold that the commerce clause 
affects the question of the proper state for trial. A Kansas corpo- 
ration brought suit in a state court in Minnesota against the di- 
rector general as agent of the Santa Fe railroad, another Kansas 
corporation. The suit was for loss of grain on a shipment be- 
tween two points in Kansas. There was a showing, by affidavits 
filed in connection with the defendant's special appearance, and 
by reference to certain facts of which the court took judicial no- 
tice, of a severe burden on the road, and interference with its 
functions as an interstate carrier incident to defending suits in 
places remote from where the facts at issue arose; and that this 
was exaggerated by the prevalence of a practice among certain 
lawyers to solicit claims against railroads for trial in distant states. 
The practice was particularly notorious in Minnesota. This 
showing convinced the court that the commerce clause had been 
violated. Mr. Justice Brandeis, who wrote the opinion, reasoned 
that although the corporation's business is entirely interstate in 
character, this does not render it immune from such process as is 
required in the orderly, effective administration of justice-in- 
cluding, perhaps, although this was not decided, 
" suits in which the cause of action arose elsewhere, if the transaction 
out of which it arose had been entered upon within the State, or if plain- 
tiff was, when it arose, a resident of the State. These questions are not 
before us; and we express no opinion upon them. But orderly, effective 
state court. This view and a similar one expressed by Fead, supra note 8, at 647, 
are criticized by Bullington, supra note 8, at i6o, for overlooking the Supreme 
Court's decision in the Reynolds case. Bullington's view is that following the 
" normal " method of service on an actual agent makes it immaterial where the cause 
arose. For an exhaustive collection of decisions of state and lower federal courts, 
see (I924) 30 A. L. R. 255. 
40 262 U. S. 3I2 (I923). 
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administration of justice clearly does not require that a foreign carrier 
shall submit to a suit in a State in which the cause of action did not arise, 
in which the transaction giving rise to it was not entered upon, in which 
the carrier neither owns nor operates a railroad, and in which the plaintiff 
does not reside." 41 
Mr. Justice Brandeis has also written all of the decisions devel- 
oping the doctrine of the Davis case. They display his character- 
istic reluctance to make sweeping generalizations, and leave unde- 
cided many questions as to when the orderly administration of 
local justice will justify the burden on interstate commerce in- 
cident to the trial of foreign causes of action. The fact that there 
are debts or tangible assets of the defendant within the state will 
not justify a clearly vexatious suit.42 Nor will the fact that the 
suit is brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act.4" 
Change of residence by the plaintiff after the cause of action 
arose will not justify suit in the new and remote forum - at least 
not without a showing that the plaintiff has some motive for the 
change other than to facilitate bringing suit."4 In all of the cases 
where the defendant succeeded in dismissing the suit, it had no 
line of railroad within the state, and apparently its local business 
was exclusively interstate in character. Whether the doctrine 
will apply to carriers also engaged in intrastate commerce or at 
all to other corporations remains undecided.45 
It has been held that there was no unreasonable burden on inter- 
41 Ibid. at 3I6-17. 
42 Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Wells, 265 U. S. 10i (1924). 
43 Michigan Cent. R. R. v. Mix, 278 U. S. 492 (1929), overruling decisions 
contra in state and lower federal courts. Cf. State ex rel. Schendel v. District Court, 
I56 Minn. 380, 194 N. W. 780 (1923); Shendel v. McGee, 300 Fed. 273 (C. C. A. 
8th, 1924); Norris v. Illinois Cent. R. R., i8 F.(2d) 584 (D. Minn. 1925). 
44 Michigan Cent. R. R. v. Mix, 278 U. S. 492 (1929). 
45 Witort v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 226 N. W. 934 (Minn. I929), (0930) 
i8 CALIF. L. REV. 311, permitted suit by an Illinois resident against an Illinois cor- 
poration for an injury occurring in Illinois. The fact that the defendant was doing 
intrastate business in Minnesota and had tracks there was held to distinguish it from 
the Davis case. See also Erving v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., i7i Minn. 87, 2I4 N. W. 
I2 (I927); Kobbe v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 173 Minn. 79, 2I6 N. W. 543 (1927); 
Gegere v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 175 Minn. 96, 220 N. W. 429 (1928). See (1928) 
42 HARV. L. REV. 13i. A similar view was expressed in Harris v. American Ry. 
Express Co., 12 F.(2d) 487 (App. D. C. 1926), certiorari denied, 273 U. S. 695 
(I926). The commerce question was not really involved. Contra: Iron City 
Produce Co. v. American Ry. Express Co., 22 Ohio App. i65, 153 N. E. 316 (1926). 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.21 on Thu, 13 Jun 2013 19:09:34 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
I234 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 
state commerce where the plaintiff had a usual place of business 
within the state and sued in connection with a shipment deliverable 
in the state, and where " for all that appears " the negligence com- 
plained of occurred there.46 A suit in the state of the defendant's 
incorporation and in a county through which its road ran, was 
upheld, although the plaintiff did not reside and the cause of ac- 
tion did not arise within the state, and notwithstanding the de- 
fendant's affidavit that it would have to bring in eleven witnesses. 
There was no showing of any interest of the plaintiff in the forum 
he had selected; but it was less than 200 miles from the place 
where the accident had occurred, and hence the burden was not 
very great.47 
How are these cases to be fitted into the scheme which draws 
a distinction between venue and jurisdiction, and between juris- 
diction over the defendant and jurisdiction over the subject mat- 
ter? They do not involve jurisdiction over the subject matter, 
for it is " elementary " that this objection can not be waived even 
by the defendant's express submission to the court, and it is hard 
to believe that the objection could be raised after a defense 
on the merits.48 It is not easy to conceive of an objection to 
jurisdiction over the person as depending on the residence of 
the plaintiff and the place of origin of the claim. Moreover, 
in the Davis case " it was assumed that the carrier had been 
found within the State." 4 Clearly the objection has nothing to 
do with the physical power concept of jurisdiction, in view of its 
46 St. Louis, B. & M. Ry. v. Taylor, 266 U. S. 200 (1924). Other cases over- 
ruling the objection because plaintiff had some legitimate interest in resorting to 
the local forum are: Maverick Mills v. Davis, 294 Fed. 404 (D. Mass. 1923) 
(plaintiff a resident and shipment deliverable in state); Griffin v. Seaboard Air 
Line Ry., 28 F.(2d) 998 (W. D. Mo. 1928) (plaintiff a resident individual); Rosen- 
blet v. Pere Marquette Ry., i62 Minn. 55, 202 N. W. 56 (I925) (same); Rouw Co. 
v. American Ry. Express Co., I73 Ark. 84, 294 S. W. 40I (I927) (plaintiff a domestic 
corporation). Contra: Thurman v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry., 254 Mass. 
569, I5i N. E. 63 (I126). 
47 Hoffman v. Missouri ex rel. Foraker, 274 U. S. 2I (I927). 
48 Cf. Pantswowe Zaklady Graviozne v. Automobile Ins. Co., 36 F.(2d) 504 
(S. D. N. Y. I929), characterizing the objection as going to the court's jurisdiction 
over the subject matter, and permitting it to be urged after action which the court 
assumed amounted to a general appearance, but which did not involve actually 
defending on the merits or apparently result in any change of position by the 
plaintiff. See (I930) 43 HARV. L. REV. 156. 
49 See Michigan Cent. R. R. v. Mix, 278 U. S, 492? 496 (I929). 
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application to cases where garnishee process has reached rolling 
stock within the state and traffic balances owed by local car- 
riers." One might conclude that it is not an objection to jurisdic- 
tion at all, but merely a constitutional requirement of a procedural 
nature, like the statutory requirement that in diversity of citizen- 
ship cases suit shall be brought in the district of residence of either 
the plaintiff or defendant.' A stumbling block to this hypothesis 
is that in Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Wells 52 a default 
judgment was set aside as void because of the violation of the 
commerce clause. From this the orthodox could deduce only that 
the defect was jurisdictional. Perhaps a council of legal prelates 
of learning and dignity comparable to the council assembled to 
deal with the classic controversy between homoiousians and homo- 
ousians could redefine the existing concepts so as to make a place 
for the new born doctrine. Meanwhile the only way to gloss over 
its somewhat monstrous character is to dignify it with the appel- 
lation sui generis. 
V 
Possibly the Wells case may be explained as a peculiar conse- 
quence 'of the Texas practice and is not authority for a general 
holding that the commerce clause objection may be used for col- 
lateral attack. Unless the Wells case really is authority to the 
contrary, it would seem that whenever a carrier is " found " within 
a state it is thereby subject to an initial determination, in the court 
where plaintiff's action is pending, of the issue whether the exi- 
gencies of local administration of justice justify the burden on in- 
terstate commerce incident to entertaining the action. Since the 
facts relied on by the carrier are such as may be shown by affidavit 
and the argument may be made by local counsel, geography has 
comparatively little to do with the burden of trying this issue. 
The burden is substantially the same in whatever court it is first 
presented, for in any event an adverse ruling may ultimately be 
reviewed by the United States Supreme Court. On the other 
hand, it may be very important to the plaintiff, if he has " plucked 
the wrong sow by the ear," that he find it out promptly. To allow 
50 Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Wells, 265 U. S. IOI (I924). 
51 See Interior Construction Co. v. Gibney, i6o U. S. 2I7 (i895); SCOTT, CASES 
ON PROCEDURE 69. 52 265 U. S. IOI (I924). 
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the commerce clause objection to be used as a basis for collateral 
attack on a default judgment, would involve possibilities of unduly 
protracting the litigation, and even of the Statute of Limitations 
running before the plaintiff can sue in another court. More- 
over, it is also in the interest of a defendant, if he has a real de- 
fense on the merits, that the objection to the forum be raised 
directly. Otherwise he may lose the opportunity to present his 
defense in case he was wrong in assuming that he had a valid ob- 
jection to the forum. The method of collateral attack after de- 
fault would appeal only to defendants who, having no substantial 
defense and therefore nothing to risk, seek to tire out the plaintiff 
or to lead him into a procedural cul de sac. It seems therefore that 
the ends of justice would best be met by requiring the defendant 
to raise his objection by a prompt special appearance. At the 
very least, it would seem within the limits of reasonable state judg- 
ment as to what the ends of justice require, and for this reason 
alone not contrary to the commerce clause. 
However, the Texas statute indicated a somewhat different 
judgment as to the appropriate method of raising the question. It 
provided that " if the citation or service thereof is quashed on mo- 
tion of the defendant . . . the defendant shall be deemed to have 
entered his appearance to the succeeding term of the court." 5 
Perhaps the statute was the result of a conviction that motions 
to quash the service, although ultimately held to be unsubstantial, 
may result in delaying trial, and that unless the defendant is sure 
enough of his objection to be willing to risk everything on it, he 
should not be allowed to present it. Whatever the reason for the 
law, its constitutionality had been upheld as applied to motions 
to quash based on the due process clause.54 If the statute was 
constitutionally applicable to objections based on the commerce 
clause, then clearly the defendant would not be concluded by a de- 
fault judgment. The legislation which expressly precluded raising 
the point directly would impliedly permit raising it collaterally, 
since obviously state legislation could not deprive the defendant 
of every opportunity of asserting his constitutional rights. But 
what of the subsequent decision in Michigan Cent. Ry. v. Mix 5 
53 TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. (I925) art. 2048. 
54 York v. Texas, I37 U. S. Is (i890). See Blair, Constructive General Appear- 
ances and Due Process (I928) 23 ILL. L. REV. II9. 55 278 U. S. 492 (I929). 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.21 on Thu, 13 Jun 2013 19:09:34 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
PLACE OF TRIAL IN CIVIL ACTIONS 1237 
(involving Missouri practice alleged to be similar) that where the 
objection is based on the commerce clause " no rule of local prac- 
tice can prevent the carrier from laying the appropriate founda- 
tion for the enforcement of its constitutional right by making a 
seasonable motion " ? Assuming that what the court announced 
in the Mix case was also the law five years earlier when the Court 
decided the Wells case, will that justify interpreting the latter as if 
the Texas statute were not on the books? Was not the statute 
at least a valid indication of the legislative preference for not rais- 
ing the point until after judgment, in case carriers should not 
insist on their constitutional rights? Could Wells have challenged 
its constitutionality, and did he purport to do so merely by be- 
ginning an action for his injuries? 
In view of the important practical objections to invoking the 
commerce clause as a reason for collateral attack on a judgment, it 
is hoped that the Court will hold the Wells case controlling only 
where there is a similar local practice - or perhaps hold that the 
Mix case has indirectly overruled it. 
The objection based on the due process clause has a different 
history, and serves, or rather served historically, a different pur- 
pose. It goes back to the physical power criterion of jurisdiction 
and to the period prior to the Fourteenth Amendment when federal 
constitutional law concerned itself only with when a state could 
pronounce such judgment as would be entitled to faith and credit. 
The requisite power to do this either existed or it did not, and no 
judicial or legislative fiat could create it. Thus default could not 
preclude defendant's claiming the judgment was a nullity when it 
was sued on in another state. Can the Island of Tobago bind the 
whole world? 56 In I878 the case of Pennoyer v. Neff 7 brought 
the due process clause into the picture, holding that unless there 
was jurisdiction over defendant a default judgment must be 
treated as a nullity even in the state where rendered. It was as- 
sumed that the test of jurisdiction was the same whether the ques- 
tion arose under the full faith and credit clause or the due process 
clause. The one required respect for a valid judgment; the other 
prevented giving effect to a void judgment.58 
56 Paraphrasing Lord Ellenborough in Buchanan v. Rucker, 9 East i9i (i8o8). 
57 95 U. S. 7I4 (I878). 
58 See Dodd, supra note 8, at 433; Magruder and Foster, supra note 7, at 
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First used merely for collateral attack, the due process clause 
was later found available as a means of direct attack - by special 
appearance and motion to dismiss or by plea or answer in abate- 
ment, whichever might be the local practice for objecting to the 
jurisdiction. Assuming the constitutional point has been ap- 
propriately presented and passed upon by a state court, the mere 
pronouncement of the judgment may be held a violation of the 
due process clause.59 Thus direct attack under the due process 
clause is possible wherever there might be collateral attack under 
it, or notwithstanding the full faith and credit clause. 
But motions to quash, pleas in abatement, and so forth, may be 
appropriate to present objections to proceeding with an action 
which are not strictly jurisdictional in the narrow sense of the 
word. For instance, there may be a statutory rule of venue on 
which the defendant is relying, or he may challenge the rule of 
venue on which the plaintiff is relying, as unreasonably discrimina- 
tory and depriving him of equal protection of the laws.60 Included 
in this class also there may be objections based on the due process 
clause and perhaps, as suggested above, that of a foreign corpora- 
tion subject to suit for some purposes, against vexatiously im- 
ported suits. This type of objection, if valid, would have nothing 
to do with the physical power concept of jurisdiction and is more 
like the objection which carriers have been permitted to urge un- 
der the commerce clause. Hence possibly these objections can 
only be urged directly. The unfortunate limitations of our legal 
vocabulary would permit the same word jurisdiction to be used in 
connection with both types of objections. 
The excuse for the foregoing elaborate and perhaps unduly 
8I5. These present an argument that a decision upholding a default judgment chal- 
lenged under the due process clause amounts to a holding that the judgment would 
be entitled to full faith and credit if sued on in another state. 
59 See Riverside Mills v. Menefee, 237 U. S. i89 (19I5). The Court did not 
cite York v. Texas, I37 U. S. I5 (i890), holding that the due process clause is not 
violated by a state practice which confines defendant to collateral attack as a means 
of invoking the protection of the clause. That the mere rendering of a judgment 
by a court without jurisdiction may be a deprivation of property, becomes easy to 
understand when we conceive of special appearances as giving a court power to pass 
on its own jurisdiction, subject to ultimate review by the Supreme Court, so that 
on failure to appeal the jurisdictional issue may become res judicata. See Note 
(1928) 4i HARV. L. REV. 1055. 
60 As in Power Mfg. Co. v. Saunders, 274 U. S. 490 (1927). 
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theological discussion of what might seem a rather narrow point 
of practice, is that the future development of the constitutional 
limitations on the place of trial is tied up with the question of how 
they are to be raised. Are these doctrines to be kept flexible and 
adaptable to the infinite variety of situations which may arise? 
Or will there be crystallization into new categories which may 
turn out to be as arbitrary and unsatisfactory as the old? The 
real need of protecting defendants from vexatiously transported 
litigation can be met without creating new traps for unwary plain- 
tiffs only if the defendants are required to be prompt in coming 
in and pointing out their objections to the forum selected. 
At its best, development of the constitutional limitations im- 
plicit in the due process and commerce clauses can not solve all 
the difficulties as to the proper place of trial. The method of con- 
stitutional limitation is only calculated to deal with the grossest 
errors of judgment on the part of state courts and legislatures, 
with cases of obvious unfair discrimination, or obvious failure to 
exercise any judgment at all as to what the ends of justice may 
require.. The states must be left free to handle as they see fit 
the cases where there is room for reasonable differences of opinion 
as to the appropriate place of trial. Due regard for the volume 
of business which the Supreme Court can handle would alone 
preclude its taking upon itself the making of nicer adjustments. 
VI 
What devices are there, then, outside the field of constitutional 
law? A direct, simple, and flexible way of meeting the issue is to 
dismiss or stay an action whenever it appears that some other 
available forum would better meet the ends of justice - to recog- 
nize something like the civil law plea of forum non conveniens. 
A recent article marshals convincing evidence that while Anglo- 
American courts have not been employing the Latin phrase they 
have been dismissing actions on grounds of convenience.61 How- 
ever, partly owing to a distrust of discretionary powers and partly 
owing to a supposed constitutional difficulty, there have been 
many decisions flatly denying that a court with jurisdiction has 
61 Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law 
(I929) 29 COL. L. REV. I. 
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any choice but to exercise it. One result of this notion we 
have already seen- the various attempts to limit jurisdiction 
with reference to what place of trial is appropriate. The 
growth of constitutional limitations would have been much less 
luxuriant had state courts felt free to dismiss on discretionary 
grounds. 
Realization that many courts would insist on showing undue 
hospitality to imported claims has led to attacks on the problem 
in the states where they arise. There have been futile legislative 
attempts to make causes of action non-exportable. The statutes 
have taken the form of providing that there shall be no liability 
unless suit is brought within the state of origin. These restric- 
tions have been disregarded when plaintiffs have sued in courts of 
other states, and the Supreme Court has held that this does not vio- 
late the full faith and credit clause.62 A state which creates a 
cause of action inherently transitory in character can not curb its 
flight. The result fits in with the generalization that procedure 
depends upon the law of the forum. Back of the judicial hostility 
to this type of legislation may also be a conviction that the legis- 
lation is too drastic. It does not allow for the cases where there 
would be a failure of justice if the plaintiff could sue only in the 
state of origin, as where he has to go to another state to get juris- 
diction over a defendant who has withdrawn after the injury, or 
to find property, or for cases where the plaintiff may have been 
injured while temporarily in the state and wants to sue at home. 
Legislation can not hope to anticipate the various situations which 
may arise. 
No such objection applies to restraining the export of causes 
of action by injunction. The equity tradition is adapted to a nice 
weighing of all the interests involved, and to imposing conditional 
decrees as occasion may require. For instance, plaintiff's claim 
that he needs to go elsewhere to attach property could be met by 
conditioning the injunction on the equity of plaintiff's giving bond 
to satisfy any judgment obtained against him in a local court of 
law, or, if the Statute of Limitations has run since the foreign 
62 Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Sowers, 2I3 U. S. 55 (I909) (common 
law liability); Tennessee Coal Co. v. George, 233 U. S. 354 (1914) (action under 
state employer's liability act). See Davis, Where May the Injured Sue? (1914) 
2 VA. L. REV. 33. 
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action was begun, plaintiff could be required to stipulate to waive 
it, or he might be required to cooperate in expediting trial. 
The fact that the court has jurisdiction over the parties and 
can pass intelligently on the appropriateness of the foreign forum 
does not prove that it is proper for it to do so. The real question 
is whether any court other than that invoked to decide the merits 
of a controversy should decide initially whether the latter is the 
appropriate court to do so. The possibility of retaliation must 
give courts pause before they tread on one another's toes. It has 
always been regarded as a very delicate matter to interfere with 
the free access of suitors to another court of equal dignity and com- 
petent jurisdiction.63 The domestic forum does not have the ex- 
cuse of acting defensively to prevent embarrassing interference 
with its own administration of justice, for it has not been asked 
to make any decision on the merits, and usually can not be invoked 
by the person against whom a claim is pending, to adjudicate 
his non-liability.64 Nor is there ordinarily any substantial advan- 
tage, based on its location, of having the home court determine 
the proper place for trial. Matters of fact affecting the question 
are for the court and are normally settled by affidavits, and it is a 
relatively simple matter to engage local attorneys by correspond- 
ence to make whatever argument is necessary.65 The principal 
reason for issuing injunctions is fear that the foreign court will not 
decide the issue properly, and conviction that the home state has 
a strong interest in having the issue determined according to its 
own views. 
63 For recent exhaustive study, see Messner, The Jurisdiction of a Court of 
Equity Over Persons to Compel the Doing of Acts Outside the Territorial Limits of 
the State (I930) I4 MINN. L. REV. 494, 495-506. See also Note (I9I9) 33 HARv. L. 
REv. 92; Pound, The Progress of the Law, i9i8-i919 Equity (I920) 33 HvARv. L. 
REV. 420, 425-28; Note (I922) 22 COL. L. REV. 360; (I925) 25 COL. L. REV. 372. 
64 The recent extensive adoption of declaratory judgment acts suggests the pos- 
sibility that the law defendant may request the home state to adjudicate his non- 
liability, and that such judgment might bar the further maintenance of the foreign 
action, thus obviating the difficulty of enforcing injunctions which do not involve 
passing on the merits. The writer knows of no instance where this was done. 
The legislation involved in Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Sowers, 2I3 U. S. 
55 (igog), contained ingenious provisions for summary determination of liability 
in case plaintiff should attempt to sue abroad contrary to its provisions. 
65 Cf. Kempson v. Kempson, 58 N. J. Eq. 94, 43 Atl. 97 (i899) (New Jersey 
defendant enjoined from continuing divorce action in North Dakota where he was 
falsely claiming to be domiciled). 
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Fear of the foreign court's decision must be based on a rule of 
law to which it is committed, and not on a distrust of its ability 
to act fairly and impartially in the exercise of the discretion open 
to it.66 If the foreign court would dismiss an action on the ground 
that it is not an appropriate forum, there would be no excuse for 
the local equity court arrogating to itself the decision of this issue. 
Injunctions are granted on the assumption that the foreign forum 
will entertain transitory actions whenever the defendant is subject 
to its jurisdiction. That this may also be the view of the home 
court, will not prevent an injunction from issuing.67 The injunc- 
tion is used not because there is any need for an equitable remedy, 
nor because of any advantages of equity practice, but to secure a 
new deal where the rule at law seems to have reached an unsatis- 
factorily rigid state. 
There is an analogy in the closely related question of enjoining 
foreign actions brought to " evade " the local law. To simplify 
analysis, it will be assumed that both parties live where the cause 
of action arose. This has been the situation in most cases where 
66 See Bank of Pittsburgh Nat. Ass'n v. United Elec. Coal Co., I42 Atl. 368 
(Del. I928); Freick v. Hinkly, I22 Minn. 24, I4i N. W. i096 (I9I3). 
67 Compare Smith v. Empire State-Idaho Mining & Dev. Co., I27 Fed. 462 
(D. Wash. i904); Reynolds v. Day, 79 Wash. 499, I40 Pac. 68i (I914), intimating 
that there is no discretion to decline jurisdiction with respect to claims of non- 
residents arising in Idaho, with Northern Pac. Ry. v. Richey & Gilbert Co., I32 
Wash. 526, 232 Pac. 355 (I925), enjoining as unduly burdensome on the equity 
plaintiff an action in Minnesota. Compare Eingartner v. The Illinois Steel Co., 
94 Wis. 70, 68 N. W. 664 (i896), holding constitution prevents denying an Illinois 
resident the privilege of suing an Illinois corporation in Wisconsin, with Chicago, 
Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. McGinley, I75 Wis. 565, i85 N. W. 2i8 (I922), intimat- 
ing that it is proper to enjoin Wisconsin plaintiff from taking his suit to a forum 
remote and burdensome to defendant, but refusing to enjoin action in adjoining 
county in Minnesota. Compare Pullman Co. v. Lawrence, 74 Miss. 782, 22 So. 
53 (I897), denying power to dismiss, with Fisher v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., I2 
Miss. 30, 72 So. 846 (i9i6), recognizing foreign injunction as a reason for dis- 
missing, and approving the issuance of an injunction against vexatious exportation 
of suits. See also cases cited in note 68, infra. For a view regarding the injunction 
cases as authority for dismissal by the law forum, see concurring opinion of Cas- 
sody, C. J., in Eingartner v. The Illinois Steel Co., supra, approved by the writer of 
the Note in (I924) 32 A. L. R. 6, iq. The Louisiana cases seem consistent with this 
view. See Stewart v. Litchenberg, I48 La. I95, 86 So. 734 (I920), prohibiting lower 
court from entertaining suit by Nebraska plaintiff against Nebraska defendant 
temporarily in Louisiana, and Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Harden, I58 La. 889, I05 So. 2 
(I925), which approves issuing an injunction in an appropriate case, although 
denying that the instant facts warranted it. 
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injunctions have issued. The implication of the word " evade " 
is that the local equity court thinks a particular transaction ought 
to be governed by its own law and that if it allows the foreign 
action to go on, the law of the forum will be applied. It may be 
that the same judge in a law case would apply the domestic law to 
a similar foreign claim.68 
Here the injunction is used because of the unsatisfactory extent 
to which Anglo-American courts have pushed the dogma that pro- 
cedure depends upon the law of the forum. To a certain extent 
the rule is founded on a practical necessity. It would be an in- 
tolerable burden on court and counsel, and consequent expense 
and delay would be enormous, if those at the forum were com- 
pelled to master all the intricacies of an unfamiliar practice. To 
the extent that it is impossible to trace a definite connection be- 
tween the application or non-application of a particular procedural 
rule and the outcome of the case, it does not shock us to follow the 
rule of the forum. We look on the two systems as different means 
to a common end. Who shall say which is the better? 
But what of such matters as exemption laws, rules against giv- 
ing preferences, rules of limitations, rules excluding a particular 
type of testimony or witness? It is easy to see how the giving of 
relief and the character of the relief if given may depend upon the 
choice between the lex Jori and the lex loci as to some one of these. 
Those who think of our system of justice as something more than 
a game of chance are shocked that matters so vitally affecting the 
outcome of the litigation should depend on anything so fortuitous 
68 Compare East Tenn., Va. & Ga. R. R. v. Kennedy, 83 Ala. 462, 3 So. 852 
(i887) with Allen v. Buchanan, 97 Ala. 399, II SO. 777 (i892); Mumper v. Wilson, 
72 Iowa i63, 33 N. W. 449 (i887), with Lyon & Co. v. Callopy, 87 Iowa 567, 
54 N. W. 476 (i893); Sandage v. Studebaker Bros. Mfg. Co., I42 Ind. I48, 4i N. E. 
380 (i895), with Baltimore, etc. R. R. v. Hollenbeck, i6i Ind. 452, 69 N. E. I36 
(I903); Goodwin v. Claytor, I37 N. C. 224, 49 S. E. 173 (I904); Wierse v. Thomas, 
I45 N. C. 26i, 59 S. E. 58 (0907). For other cases, see (0905) i L. R. A. (N.S.) 
195; (1907) I5 L. R. A. (N.S.) ioo8. In National Tube Co. v. Smith, 57 W. Va. 2IO, 
50 S. E. 7I7 (I905), wages exempt by the law of the domicil of plaintiff and defend- 
ant were garnished in state A, and resort was had to equity in A. An injunction 
was denied, the court reasoning that the practice of issuing injunctions at the domicil 
recognizes lack of any remedy at the forum. A few cases refuse to permit garnish- 
ment of wages on account of exemption laws of the state where plaintiff and 
defendant reside, saying that they will not permit plaintiff to " evade " the law of 
his domicil. See (1914) I2 MIcE. L. REV. 487. 
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as the place of trial. This feeling is doubtless responsible for the 
tendency of some American and most continental courts to clas- 
sify many of these as matters of substance and apply the lex loci. 
The more orthodox Anglo-American courts of law seem to ignore 
these practical considerations in order to preserve the logical sym- 
metry of the distinction between procedure and substantive law. 
The only escape has been resort to equity, which has enforced its 
view that the local law should govern, by confining the law plain- 
tiff to suit in a local court of law.69 The commonest and most 
generally accepted instances for issuing the injunction are to 
prevent " evasion " of the local exemption and insolvency laws.70 
There is less authority for and more criticism of injunctions to pre- 
vent the law plaintiff from taking advantage of more favorable 
foreign rules for determining the issues of fact - or as to what 
may be a defense.7" Where the equity plaintiff can only show that 
the foreign procedure decreases his chance of victory without be- 
ing at all certain to lead to a different result, he has little chance 
of getting his injunction." There must be a strong case. 
Assuming an injunction is obtained, will it be of avail to the law 
defendant? 7 If the law plaintiff continues his residence or has 
69 This generalization as to the continental law is based exclusively on the 
footnotes to LORENZEN, CASES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d ed. I924) c. IV, Pro- 
cedure. See also Lorenzen, The Statute of Frauds and the Conflict of Laws (I923) 
32 YALE L. J. 3II, 327. 
70 The constitutionality of issuing the injunction was approved by a divided 
Court in Cole v. Cunningham, I33 U. S. 107 (i890). 
71 See Weaver v. Alabama Great So. R. R., 200 Ala. 432, 76 So. 364 (1917), 
enjoining suit in Georgia court which would not apply the Alabama rule that failure 
to stop, look, and listen requires a directed verdict for defendant. Meeting the 
law plaintiff's argument that this was procedural and that by Alabama law the lex 
fori should govern, the court said there would be ground for an injunction if Georgia 
law disqualified the only witness. Culp v. Butler, 69 Ind. App. 668, I22 N. E. 684 
(i919), enjoined an Illinois action on a claim barred by the Indiana Statute of 
Limitations. Cases of this type are criticized in Note (1919) 33 HARV. L. REV. 92, 
94, and by Pound, supra note 63, at 427. 
72 See Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. McGinley, I75 Wis. 565, i85 N. W. 
2i8 (I92I); Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul R. R. v. Wolf, 226 N. W. 297 (Wis. 
I929); Missouri-K.-T. R. R. v. Ball, I26 Kan. 745, 271 Pac. 3I3 (I928); American 
Express Co. v. Fox, I35 Tenn. 489, i87 S. W. III7 (i9I6); Reed's Adm'rx v. 
Illinois Cent. R. R., I82 Ky. 455, 206 S. W. 794 (I9I8) (injunction issued because 
of remoteness of foreign forum, the court expressly denying that differences in 
procedure were relevant). 
73 For careful analysis of cases, see Note (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 719. See also 
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permanent property there, the equity court has adequate power 
to compel obedience to its decree. Unfortunately it is likely to be 
impotent in one of the most frequent cases of vexatiously trans- 
ported litigation - where an impecunious personal injury claim- 
ant has put his case in the hands of a foreign ambulance chaser 
who offers to support him while it is pending. The ambulance 
chaser has only to persuade him to remove to the state where suit 
is to be brought. He may then defy with impunity the processes 
of the equity court at his former home.74 
The efficacy of the injunction depends upon whether the for- 
eign court will recognize it as a reason for dismissing the law 
action brought or continued in defiance of it. Does the full faith 
and credit clause require recognition of it? It is hard to see why 
the equity decree should be entitled to any greater recognition than 
a statute of the same state prohibiting the export of causes of 
action."5 There is no finding of fact with respect to the matter 
in dispute between the parties - only an expression of the local 
policy with respect to the place where trial ought to take place. 
At one time there was doubt whether the equity court could issue 
an injunction without denying full faith and credit to the judicial 
proceedings of the foreign law court. This difficulty was circum- 
vented by saying that it was not the foreign court but the equity 
defendant whose action was enjoined.7" If the equity decree were 
Messner, supra note 63, at 500; CONFLICT OF LAWS RESTATEMENT (I929) ? 493, 
and explanatory note. 
74 " Ambulance chasing " was involved in Reed's Adm'rx v. Illinois Cent. R. R., 
supra note 72 (granting injunction); Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Wolf, 
226 N. W. 297 (Wis. I929) (denying injunction because of insufficient showing of 
hardship on defendant). See facts shown and taken notice of in Davis v. Farmers 
Co-operative Co., 262 U. S. 3I2 (I923). 
75 See supra note 6o. See Langmaid, The Full Faith and Credit Required for 
Public Acts (I929) 24 ILL. L. REV. 383, 403, 408, suggesting that whether the law 
forum is required to give full faith and credit to the equity decree depends on 
whether such decree is constitutional, and challenging the soundness of the doctrine 
of Cole v. Cunningham. The author's thesis is that substantially similar credit is to 
be extended to statutes and to decrees attempting the same thing. Atchison, 
Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Sowers, and Tennessee Coal Co. v. George, both supra 
note 62, are explained on the ground that the legislatures at the sits had no jurisdic- 
tion to legislate with reference to suit in other states on actions transitory in 
nature. Possibly a statute limited in terms to the usual case where injunctions issue 
would have fared better. 
76 See Messner, supra note 63, citing Cole v. Cunningham, I33 U. S. I07 (i890), 
and Dehon v. Foster, 4 Allen 545, 550 (Mass. i862). 
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entitled to full faith and credit, the injunction would be in every- 
thing but form an order restraining the foreign court itself. Ac- 
cordingly there is almost no substantial authority for compulsory 
recognition of the decree in the foreign law court.77 
It seems doubtful whether the problem would be greatly changed 
by Congress passing the American Bar Association bill for extend- 
ing the full faith and credit clause to all equitable decrees. While 
Congress is given power to prescribe the manner in which public 
acts, records, and judicial proceedings shall be proved, and the 
effect thereof,78 the existing legislation, which dates from I790, 
seems so far as judicial proceedings are concerned to be as sweep- 
ing as the constitutional grant of power. After providing for the 
manner of authenticating another state's records and exemplifica- 
tions it requires that they " shall have such faith and credit given 
to them . . . as they have by law or usage in the courts . . . of 
the state . . . from which they are taken." 79 
77 The issue has not been directly passed on by the Supreme Court. A dissenting 
opinion of a state court was all that could be found by the writer of Note (1930) 
39 YALE L. J. 7i9. He cites the following cases refusing recognition and points 
out that even the few cases granting it do not hold that recognition is obligatory. 
Nichols & Shepard Co. v. Wheeler, I50 Ky. i69, I50 S. W. 33 (I9I2) (Tennessee 
interlocutory decree held no bar, without discussion); State ex rel. Bossung v. 
District Court, I40 Minn. 494, 498, i68 N. W. 589, 59i (i9i8); Frye v. Chicago, 
R. I. & Pac. Ry., I57 Minn. 52, i95 N. W. 629 (I923), certiorari denied, 263 U. S. 
723 (I924); Union Pac. R. R. v. Rule, I55 Minn. 302, 305, I93 N. W. i6i, i62 
(1923); Kepner v. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Ry., I5 S. W.(2d) 825 (Mo. I929) 
(evidence of foreign injunction rejected). The explanatory note to ? 493 of CON- 
FLICT OF LAWS RESTATEMENT (I929), raises the question whether, if a statute can 
not vest in a domiciliary receiver title to property elsewhere, even as against do- 
mestic creditors, any greater effect should be accorded an injunction against foreign 
suits. The restatement makes the question turn on whether the injunction affects 
the merits, but gives as an illustration: 
" 2. A, a creditor of B, is enjoined in a court of state X, the domicil of both, 
from obtaining payment of his claim in any state in competition with other credi- 
tors. A makes an attachment on property of B in state Y. On the injunction in 
X being shown to the court in Y, by another creditor, the attachment will be 
dissolved." 
78 U. S. CONST. Art. IV, ? i. 
79 The quoted language dates from I STAT. I22 (1790). The present form is 
found in 28 U. S. C. ? 688 (I926). For history of the legislation, see Langmaid, 
supra note 75, at 387. For amendments not here relevant, see 2 STAT. 298 (I804); 
i6 STAT. 4I9 (I87I). For text of proposed bill, see (I927) 52 A. B. A. REP. 292, 3I9. 
It provides for registration and thereupon giving the same effect as if originally 
rendered in the court where registered, " to every judgment, decree or order " of 
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The statutory paraphrase of the constitutional provision makes 
the existing decisions turn on the extent of the constitutional obli- 
gation, and not merely on the interpretation of existing federal 
legislation. The proposed bill would simplify the procedure in 
cases where a foreign decree would now be entitled to recognition. 
Insofar as the bill attempts anything more, its enactment would 
be significant only as an expression, more specific than hereto- 
fore, of how far Congress thinks the full faith and credit clause 
should extend. As such it would be only persuasive, and not even 
that except on points still open under the existing decisions. It 
may be that under the proposed bill or possibly even under exist- 
ing legislation, faith and credit will be generally extended to such 
equitable decrees as relate to disposal of the merits of the contro- 
versy.80 But before we are ready for compulsory recognition of 
injunctions against suit in particular courts there must be a clearer 
demarcation of the extent to which the granting of such injunc- 
tions is consistent with due respect for the foreign court of law 
of the extent to which any court other than the law forum should 
have ultimate power to decide whether it shall try a cause against 
a defendant subject to its jurisdiction. Perhaps it is proper to 
lodge this ultimate power in a court which is at the domicil of both 
parties and where the cause of action arose. It certainly would not 
be appropriate to accord such power to every court that happens 
to get jurisdiction over the law defendant. 
A stronger case can be made for discretionary recognition of the 
equity decree. If the court in which the law action is pending 
would not as a court of law entertain the law defendant's plea 
that it is an inappropriate forum, but would as a court of equity 
issue an injunction to prevent one of its own residents from bring- 
ing a vexatious action abroad, it can not regard a similar decree 
of another court as an unwarranted interference. It should respect 
the foreign decree and hope that foreign courts will respect its own 
similar decrees. The same argument would apply in favor of dis- 
cretionary foreign recognition of injunctions to prevent " eva- 
sion " of local exemption laws and the like. 
a court of a state, having jurisdiction, " requiring that money be paid, or that any 
act shall or shall not be done, or establishing a status, or investing any person with 
authority over property." Cf. Note (I930) 39 YALE L. J. 7I9, 725. 
80 CONFLICT OF LAWS RESTATEMENT (I929) ? 493. 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.21 on Thu, 13 Jun 2013 19:09:34 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
1248 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 
There is some authority for discretionary recognition.8" Many 
of the cases disregarding the equity decree may be explained as 
results of the recently exploded notion that the privileges and im- 
munities clause requires the same treatment for a citizen of a 
sister state suing away from his home as would be accorded a 
citizen of the forum who wants to sue at his home.82 The extreme 
of this mechanistic concept was the view of the Minnesota court 
that since it would permit one of its own citizens to sue, notwith- 
standing the foreign injunction of another state, it must permit a 
citizen of another state to sue, although in defiance of a court at 
his domicil.83 Another reason for denying any effect to the in- 
junction may be a feeling that the law forum should itself decide 
what cases it will try. 
The difficulty both in obtaining and enforcing the injunction 
makes it appear a rather inadequate makeshift, of some use in 
correcting certain of the more extreme abuses resulting from the 
dogma that a court of law will entertain transitory actions wher- 
ever the defendant may be found. The chief significance of the 
equity cases, like the decisions developing constitutional limita- 
tions, is to indicate the need of meeting the issue directly by stay- 
ing or dismissing pending actions whenever another forum is more 
appropriate. The recent case of Douglas v. New York, N. H. & 
H. R. R. 84 points to the possibility of future development along 
this line. It is hoped to deal with this possibility in a subsequent 
article, and to touch upon the parallel problem of determining the 
appropriate county for trial, and upon the criteria which should 
govern, once a court is free to exercise discretion as to the place 
of trial. 
Roger S. Foster. 
YALE UNIVERSITy LAW SCHOOL. 
81 Fisher v. Pacific Mut. Ins. Co., II2 Miss. 30, 72 So. 846 (ioi6); Allen v. 
Chicago Great Western R. R., 239 Ill. App. 38 (I925). It is doubtful how to 
classify Gilman v. Ketchman, 84 Wis. 6o, 54 N. W. 395 (i893) (injunction against 
interfering with receiver's claim to foreign assets); see note 77, supra. 
82 See Note (I930) 39 YALE L. J. 7io. 
83 State ex rel. Bossung v. District Court, supra note 77. The constitutional 
difficulty seems to have been removed by Douglas v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 
279 U. S. 377 (I929); see Note (0930) i8 CALIF. L. REV. I59. 
84 See note 83, supra. 
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